NASA's Dysfunctional Teams

So this article is about NASA's teams and how they are dysfunctional. More specifically though it focus on a specific team called the MMT (Mission Management Team). This was the team responsible for making decisions about missions that the space shuttle would take. This article highlights a specific mission. The last mission that the space shuttle Challenger would ever take. The article explains that the MMT came together and had group meetings about the severity and the possible solutions to the problem. The problem being that a piece of foam had managed to penetrate the thermal protection of one of the space shuttle wings. The way the MMT responded was inadequate at best. They acted in a dysfunctional way that probably could have otherwise prevented this disaster from happening. The team didn't take into account the whole picture, and they most certainly did not leave an open mind. They ended up coming to the conclusion that the foam could not seriously damage the shuttle and this prevented any further discussion that could have otherwise prevented this. This type of team behavior is a reckless and harmful. As stated in the article confirmation bias also played a role in this incident as well. Assumptions and preconceived notations on what a team knows or does not know can have inherent consequences to what the team is trying to achieve. The outcomes may not be negative all of the time but it is safe to assume that human error in group situations such as this can lead to bad decision making. Not having or evaluating all of the data plays into the decision making process as well, and that  is why it is important to get the  necessary information in order to make an informed decision. This disaster could have been avoided if the team would have just exhausted all possible options instead of dismissing certain alternatives without basis, and made assumptions about camera resolution. In short gathering and analyzing data for decision making can make or break what you are trying to achieve.